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In 1970, Senator Edward M. Kennedy introduced a bill to add a 
waiver of sovereign immunity to the Administrative Procedure Act. A 
series of Supreme Court opinions had left sovereign immunity doctrine 
hopelessly muddled, making it unclear when plaintiffs could challenge 
federal agency actions in court. Initially, Kennedy’s bill languished 
because the Executive Branch opposed it. Then Antonin Scalia became 
Assistant Attorney General, and the Executive Branch changed its 
position. As Scalia explained, however, the Executive Branch 
conditioned its support for the bill on the understanding that the 
amendment would not throw open the courthouse doors for claims 
against the United States, but would be subject to the other limitations 
of the APA. The groups that had drafted the bill shared that 
understanding. Senator Kennedy accepted Scalia’s conditions, and the 
bill finally passed in 1976.  
 
Unfortunately, the amendment that was meant to clarify the law has 
not done so. Instead, the question of how to interpret the APA’s waiver 
of sovereign immunity has generated inter- and intra-circuit splits and 
general confusion. Moreover, the majority of the federal courts of 
appeals have ignored Scalia and Kennedy’s bargain and have held 
that the waiver of sovereign immunity in the APA is not constrained by 
the other limitations in the APA. This Article—the first to address this 
issue—argues that the majority approach misinterprets the waiver and 
raises serious concerns related to separation of powers, democratic 
legitimacy, and the institutional competence of the courts, and should 
not stand. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Sovereign immunity insulates the United States from suit absent a 
statutory waiver of that immunity. It does not prevent plaintiffs from suing 
officers of the United States for acting outside the scope of their authority and 
seeking injunctive relief.1 Starting in 1949, however, a series of confusing 
Supreme Court decisions muddled the law by holding that sovereign immunity 
bars such officer suits if the relief requested would operate against the United 
States.2 The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA) might have deferred 
the urgency of clarifying this area of the law; it provided for judicial review of 
agency action.3 But the federal courts of appeals were split on the question of 
whether the APA waived the government’s sovereign immunity. The Supreme 
Court showed no inclination to resolve the question of when a plaintiff could 
challenge official federal action using either an officer suit or the APA.4 
To clarify the law, the Administrative Conference of the United States 
(ACUS) and the American Bar Association (ABA) developed a proposal to 
add a waiver of sovereign immunity to the APA. The Department of Justice 
(DOJ) opposed the amendment, and it languished in Senator Edward M. 
Kennedy’s subcommittee for years. Then, Antonin Scalia became an Assistant 
Attorney General, and in 1976, he announced the Department’s change in 
position. The DOJ’s support for the bill, however, was premised on the 
understanding that the waiver would not throw open the courthouse doors for 
claims against the United States, but would be subject to the other limitations 
of the APA. Senator Kennedy accepted Scalia’s conditions, and the bill finally 
passed.5 
                                                                                                                     
 1 See infra text accompanying notes 20–22. 
 2 See infra text accompanying notes 19–52. 
 3 Administrative Procedure Act § 106(a), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). 
 4 See infra Part II.A. 
 5 See infra Part II.B. 
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In the years that have followed, the majority of the federal courts of 
appeals have ignored Scalia and Kennedy’s bargain and held that the waiver is 
not constrained by the other limitations in the APA.6 The majority approach 
simply misinterprets the text, and the history confirms that the majority is 
wrong.7 Ironically, Justice Antonin Scalia, if called on to interpret this waiver, 
would have discounted the legislative history that he created as Assistant 
Attorney General.8 Justice Scalia would have focused on the text and probably 
would have agreed that the majority is interpreting the waiver incorrectly. 
I too believe that interpretations of the APA must remain within the 
boundaries of the text. The APA has been shaped by exceptional legislative 
effort, before and after its enactment, and no single agency is empowered to 
interpret the Act. Consequently, if we are to give sufficient respect to public 
deliberation, interpretations of the APA cannot exceed the scope of the terms 
Congress enacted. To determine where the boundaries of the text are, however, 
requires a close examination of the full context and history of each provision 
of the APA. If we are to implement the compromises codified in the Act, we 
must know which provisions were compromises, and we cannot know that 
without studying the statutory history. The history here shows that the waiver 
of sovereign immunity was a compromise; it opened the courthouse doors, but 
not all the way.  
Misconstruing the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity raises significant 
concerns. Yet, this Article is the first to raise the alarm on this issue. The APA 
is among the most important statutes in U.S. law;9 it provides the legal 
framework for federal agencies,10 including judicial oversight of the “fourth 
branch.”11 Misinterpreting the APA can have vast implications, and doctrinal 
confusion about the availability of relief under the APA imposes costs on both 
the government and potential plaintiffs.12 Moreover, while allowing access to 
                                                                                                                     
 6 See infra Part III. 
 7 See infra Part IV. 
 8 See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION 
OF LEGAL TEXTS 29, 375–78 (2012) (asserting that the use of legislative history poses 
major problems, including the assumption that we are looking for the legislature’s intent 
“rather than the meaning of the statutory text,” the “fantasy” that the legislature had a focus 
“on the narrow point before the court,” and the possibility for “manipulation and 
distortion” in the legislative history). 
 9 See Susan E. Dudley, Improving Regulatory Accountability: Lessons from the Past 
and Prospects for the Future, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1027, 1032 (2015). 
 10 See Steven P. Croley, The Administrative Procedure Act and Regulatory Reform: A 
Reconciliation, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 35, 35 (1996). 
 11 See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting) (“[Administrative bodies] have become a veritable fourth branch of the 
Government, which has deranged our three-branch legal theories much as the concept of a 
fourth dimension unsettles our three-dimensional thinking.”). 
 12 Nicholas Bagley, The Puzzling Presumption of Reviewability, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
1285, 1329–36 (2014) (noting that some costs can include reducing an agency’s resources 
and flexibility and increasing lawyers’ influence in decisionmaking). 
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the courts to remedy government wrongs is generally a good thing, Congress 
is entitled to decide whether and when to expose the United States to suit. It is 
not for the courts to upset that constitutional design, even in the pursuit of a 
laudable goal. Ignoring Scalia’s bargain raises separation of powers and 
democratic legitimacy concerns that outweigh the benefits of expanded 
judicial review under the APA.13 
In a recent petition for certiorari, now-Judge Randolph Moss and former-
Solicitor General Seth Waxman urged the Supreme Court to resolve the circuit 
split on the question of whether the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity is 
constrained by another limitation in the APA.14 That split, they asserted, “has 
persisted for years and has only grown worse with time.”15 The Supreme 
Court denied that petition,16 but it will have to step in at some point in the near 
future to clarify the scope of this important statutory provision. 
Part II of this Article tells the story of the 1976 amendment, from the 
doctrinal confusion that inspired it to Senator Kennedy thanking Scalia for his 
involvement on the Senate floor when the bill passed. Part III lays out the 
circuit splits and general confusion in the courts of appeals’ interpretations of 
the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity. Part IV argues that the majority of 
circuit courts have misinterpreted the waiver, and Part V explains why Scalia’s 
bargain should prevail. 
II. HISTORY OF THE 1976 AMENDMENT 
A. Doctrinal Confusion 
To sue the United States, a complaint must state a basis for jurisdiction, a 
cause of action, and a waiver of sovereign immunity.17 A single statute may 
provide all three, but they are distinct requirements. Subject matter jurisdiction 
implicates “the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the 
case.”18 The APA does not provide jurisdiction.19 The federal question 
jurisdiction statute, however, usually gives the federal district courts authority 
to hear claims against the federal government.20 A complaint must also 
                                                                                                                     
 13 See infra Part V.B. 
 14 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, 11–12, Cal. Table Grape Comm’n v. Delano 
Farms Co., 133 S. Ct. 644 (2012) (mem.) (No. 11-1371) (presenting the question whether 
the waiver in § 702 “appl[ies] to a claim that does not challenge the legality of ‘agency 
action’ or ‘final agency action’ within the meaning of the [APA]”). 
 15 Id. at 11–12. 
 16 Delano Farms Co., 133 S. Ct. 644. 
 17 Kathryn E. Kovacs, Revealing Redundancy: The Tension Between Federal 
Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 77, 79 (2005). 
 18 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (emphasis omitted). 
 19 Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107 (1977). 
 20 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012); SECTION OF ADMIN. LAW & REGULATORY PRACTICE, AM. 
BAR ASS’N, A BLACKLETTER STATEMENT OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 47 (2d ed. 
2013) [hereinafter BLACKLETTER STATEMENT]; GREGORY C. SISK, LITIGATION WITH THE 
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identify a “source of substantive law . . . [that] provides an avenue for 
relief.”21 Many statutes provide a cause of action to challenge official action, 
including the APA which has provided a cause of action since 1946.22 The 
first sentence of what is now 5 U.S.C. § 702 provides: “A person suffering 
legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by 
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial 
review thereof.”23 Since 1976, the APA has also waived the United States’ 
sovereign immunity from suit.24 The boundaries of that waiver, however, are 
still unsettled. 
In 1882, the Supreme Court announced that, although federal sovereign 
immunity had “never been discussed or the reasons for it given, . . . it ha[d] 
always been treated as an established doctrine.”25 Sovereign immunity 
insulates the federal government from suit “in the absence of an express 
waiver of this immunity by Congress.”26 Unless a statute unambiguously 
waives sovereign immunity, federal courts have no jurisdiction to hear a claim 
against the United States.27 
Despite that bar, a plaintiff can challenge government action by filing a 
suit for injunctive relief against a federal officer alleging that the officer acted 
outside the scope of his authority.28 Such suits rest on the same theory as Ex 
parte Young, which bypasses state sovereign immunity in suits against state 
officers.29 That is, if the officer acted ultra vires, he did not act “on behalf of 
                                                                                                                     
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 335 (4th ed. 2006). Some statutes provide for exclusive review in 
the courts of appeals for specific kinds of cases. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2342; see also 
BLACKLETTER STATEMENT, supra, at 47 (noting that the Hobbs Act can provide jurisdiction 
in some cases). 
 21 Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484 (1994). 
 22 BLACKLETTER STATEMENT, supra note 20, at 49. 
 23 Administrative Procedure Act § 106(a), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). Section 704 further 
specifies: “Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which 
there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.” Id. § 704. 
 24 Id. § 702. 
 25 United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 207 (1882). 
 26 Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 280 
(1983). 
 27 Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (first citing Loeffler v. 
Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 554 (1988); and then citing Fed. Hous. Admin. v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 
244 (1940)). See generally Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, 
Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521, 523–52 (2003) 
(documenting the development of sovereign immunity jurisprudence and explaining the 
distinction between state and federal sovereign immunity). 
 28 Kovacs, supra note 17, at 87–88; see also Am. Sch. of Magnetic Healing v. 
McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 108 (1902) (“[I]n case an official violates the law to the injury of 
an individual[,] the courts generally have jurisdiction to grant relief.”). 
 29 See Jonathan R. Siegel, Suing the President: Nonstatutory Review Revisited, 97 
COLUM. L. REV. 1612, 1624 (1997). 
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the sovereign and hence, is not protected by sovereign immunity.”30 This kind 
of officer suit is known as “nonstatutory review” because no statute waives the 
federal government’s sovereign immunity.31 
The confusion began in 1949 with Larson v. Domestic & Foreign 
Commerce Corp.32 The plaintiff corporation in Larson sought to enjoin the 
War Assets Administration from selling surplus coal to anyone other than the 
plaintiff.33 The Supreme Court reiterated the established doctrine that if a 
federal officer is acting within his statutory authority, sovereign immunity bars 
any suit challenging his action, but his ultra vires or unconstitutional actions 
may be restrained because they “are considered individual and not sovereign 
actions.”34 In Larson, the Administrator was acting within the scope of his 
authority.35 Thus, his action was “inescapably the action of the United States 
and the effort to enjoin it . . . fail[ed] as an effort to enjoin the United 
States.”36 What muddied the waters was the Court’s footnote stating that, even 
if nonstatutory review were otherwise available against an officer who acted 
ultra vires, suit would be barred nonetheless “if the relief requested can not 
[sic] be granted by merely ordering the cessation of the conduct complained 
of[,] but will require affirmative action by the sovereign or the disposition of 
unquestionably sovereign property.”37  
In 1963, the Supreme Court in Dugan v. Rank followed Larson in holding 
that, although nonstatutory review is available to enjoin an officer’s ultra vires 
actions, if the judgment would operate against the government itself, sovereign 
immunity bars the suit.38 The plaintiffs in Dugan were water rights claimants 
who sought to enjoin federal officials from storing and diverting water at the 
Friant Dam in California.39 Granting that relief, the Court held, would impair 
                                                                                                                     
 30 Kovacs, supra note 17, at 89; see also Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce 
Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689–90, 693 (1949). 
 31 See Kovacs, supra note 17, at 78 n.3. As Adrian Vermeule points out, the use of the 
term “nonstatutory review” is a misnomer because, even in a nonstatutory review case, 
some statute necessarily provides subject matter jurisdiction. Adrian Vermeule, Our 
Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1115 (2009). 
 32 Larson, 337 U.S. at 689–90; see also Memorandum from Roger C. Cramton to 
Comm. on Judicial Review (1969) [hereinafter Cramton Memo], reprinted in Sovereign 
Immunity: Hearing on S. 3568 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice & Procedure of 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. app. I, at 102 (1970) [hereinafter 1970 Hearing] 
(supporting statutory reform for sovereign immunity). I do not contend that the law was 
entirely clear before 1949, but the modern confusion stems from Larson. For a more in-
depth discussion of this issue, see generally Kovacs, supra note 17. 
 33 Larson, 337 U.S. at 684. 
 34 Id. at 689. 
 35 Id. at 703. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. at 691 n.11. 
 38 Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620, 621–22 (1963); see also Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 
U.S. 57, 58 (1963) (per curiam) (“[R]elief sought nominally against an officer is in fact 
against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter.”). 
 39 Dugan, 372 U.S. at 610.  
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the operation of a reclamation project that Congress had authorized and 
funded, and prevent the government from fulfilling its obligations under water 
delivery contracts.40 Thus, “The Government would, indeed, be ‘stopped in its 
tracks,’” and sovereign immunity barred the claim.41 
Larson and Dugan were part of “a long and bewildering series of Supreme 
Court decisions”42 that led to tremendous confusion about when a party could 
challenge official government action.43 In 1970, then-professor Antonin Scalia 
said that “the effect of sovereign immunity upon nonstatutory review . . . truly 
surpasseth human understanding.”44 After analyzing the case law closely, he 
concluded that reconciliation of the cases was “unattainable.”45 Later, as 
Assistant Attorney General, Scalia said, “No one can read the significant 
Supreme Court cases on sovereign immunity . . . without concluding that the 
field is a mass of confusion; and if he ventures beyond that to attempt some 
reconciliation of the courts of appeals decisions, he will find confusion 
compounded.”46 The Fourth Circuit agreed “that an effort to establish logical 
consistency in the decisions dealing with sovereign immunity is bound to be 
frustrating. The authorities are not reconcilable, and there are conceptual 
conflicts in the various holdings . . . .”47 
Terms used to describe sovereign immunity doctrine in the years leading 
up to the 1976 APA amendment included “illogical, artificial, erratic, and 
confusing,”48 “unjust or irrational,”49 “haphazard, unpredictable, unfair, 
inconsistent,”50 “permeated with sophistry,”51 and “gross[ly] inefficien[t].”52 
                                                                                                                     
 40 Id. at 621. 
 41 Id. (quoting Larson, 337 U.S. at 704). 
 42 Letter from Antonin Scalia, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to Edward M. 
Kennedy, Chairman, U.S. Senate Subcomm. on Admin. Practice & Procedure (May 10, 
1976) [hereinafter Letter from Scalia to Kennedy], in S. REP. NO. 94-996, at 24, 25 (1976).  
 43 S. REP. NO. 94-996, at 6 (“The doctrinal confusion is such that the courts are 
divided on the fundamental question of whether or not sovereign immunity bars actions for 
equitable relief.”). 
 44 Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal 
Administrative Action: Some Conclusions from the Public-Lands Cases, 68 MICH. L. REV. 
867, 871 (1970). 
 45 Id. at 872. 
 46 Letter from Scalia to Kennedy, supra note 42, at 25 (citations omitted); see also 
1970 Hearing, supra note 32, at 22 (comment of Roger C. Cramton) (“A series of Supreme 
Court decisions in recent years has created so much confusion that clear answers to these 
questions are not possible.”). 
 47 Littell v. Morton, 445 F.2d 1207, 1211–12 (4th Cir. 1971). 
 48 1970 Hearing, supra note 32, at 2 (statement of Sen. Kennedy); see also id. at 22 
(comment of Roger C. Cramton) (“confused, artificial, and erratic”); id. at 46 (statement of 
Roger C. Cramton) (stating that the sovereign immunity doctrine was “totally erratic, 
haphazard, unpredictable, unfair, inconsistent, and, in some situations, unjust”). 
 49 Id. at 3 (statement of Sen. Kennedy); see Cramton Memo, supra note 32, at 117 
(“confused, illogical, and sometimes . . . unjust”); see also Kenneth Culp Davis, Sovereign 
Immunity Must Go, reprinted in 1970 Hearing, supra note 32, app. II, at 221–22 (arguing 
that sovereign immunity causes “frequent denial of substantive justice[,] . . . denial of 
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In more contemporary regulatory statutes, Congress had included waivers 
of sovereign immunity “authorizing Federal courts to review the legality of 
administrative action that has adversely affected private citizens.”53 Those 
waivers, however, generally did not apply to “older executive departments, 
such as the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Justice, Interior, and 
Agriculture.”54 In suits against those agencies, it was impossible to predict 
when the government would invoke sovereign immunity and whether 
nonstatutory review would be available or not.55 The consensus was 
widespread among scholars and practitioners outside the government that 
sovereign immunity doctrine “should be put out of its misery.”56  
The APA might already have provided a partial solution. The 1946 Act 
provided a right of review to challenge “agency action.”57 Thus, a plaintiff 
seeking to enjoin a federal officer’s action might have brought an APA claim 
to avoid the pitfalls of nonstatutory review. The federal courts of appeals, 
however, were split on the question of whether the APA waived the 
government’s sovereign immunity.58 The D.C. Circuit, for example, reasoned 
“that one must imply, from a statement by the Congress that judicial review of 
agency action will be granted, an intention on the part of Congress to waive 
the right of sovereign immunity; any other construction would make the 
                                                                                                                     
procedural justice[,] . . . and gross inefficiency resulting from depriving the courts of 
authority to resolve controversies the courts are especially qualified to resolve”). 
 50 1970 Hearing, supra note 32, at 46 (statement of Roger C. Cramton). 
 51 Davis, supra note 49, at 213. 
 52 Id. at 201. 
 53 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1656, at 5 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94-996, at 4 (1976). 
 54 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1656, at 5; S. REP. NO. 94-996, at 4.  
 55 1970 Hearing, supra note 32, at 24 (comment of Roger C. Cramton); see also id. at 
46, 47 (statement of Roger C. Cramton) (noting confusion in the “availability of 
nonstatutory review”). 
 56 Administrative Procedure Act Amendments of 1976: Hearing on S. 796, S. 797, 
S. 798, S. 799, S. 800, S. 1210, S. 1289, S. 2407, S. 2408, S. 2715, S. 2792, C. 3123, 
S. 3296, and S. 3297 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice & Procedure of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. app. F, at 221 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Hearing] 
(statement of Richard Berg); see also Cramton Memo, supra note 32, at 114 
(“Dissatisfaction with the present doctrine of sovereign immunity is widespread.”); id. at 
114–15 (describing academic and judicial criticism of sovereign immunity doctrine at the 
time); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1656, at 8 (“[T]he consensus in the administrative law community 
among scholars and practitioners is strong with regard to the elimination of sovereign 
immunity.”); S. REP. NO. 94-996, at 7 (same). See generally Davis, supra note 49, at 201–
02 (“Congress should abolish nearly all of what is left of sovereign immunity.”). 
 57 Administrative Procedure Act § 106(a), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). The APA does not 
provide jurisdiction. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107 (1977). 
 58 See Schlafly v. Volpe, 495 F.2d 273, 281 (7th Cir. 1974) (“One question regarding 
which there exists a clear conflict among the Circuits is whether the APA constitutes a 
waiver of sovereign immunity.”); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1656, at 10 n.33; S. REP. NO. 94-996, 
at 10 n.33; Scalia, supra note 44, app. at 923. 
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review provisions illusory.”59 The Fourth Circuit, in contrast, reached the 
opposite conclusion because the Supreme Court had applied sovereign 
immunity without discussing the APA in cases in which the APA might have 
provided a waiver.60 The Supreme Court showed no inclination to resolve the 
matter.61  
The confusion about the effect of Larson and Dugan on nonstatutory 
review persists.62 Pursuing nonstatutory review successfully requires 
navigating a minefield of often-conflicting Supreme Court precedents.63 The 
need to map a plaintiff’s path through that muddled doctrine, however, lost its 
urgency when Congress added a waiver of sovereign immunity to the APA in 
1976.64 The 1976 amendment paved an avenue to court to challenge the 
federal government’s actions and bypass nonstatutory review.65 The outer 
boundaries of that avenue, however, are still hazy, as detailed in Part III of this 
Article. 
B. Deliberative Process 
The ACUS and the ABA jointly developed a proposal to alleviate the 
confusion permeating sovereign immunity doctrine and nonstatutory review. 
The ACUS and the ABA did not propose to overturn Larson and Dugan or 
codify requirements for officer suits. Instead, they proposed providing an 
alternative means for challenging official action by adding a waiver of 
sovereign immunity to the APA.66 The proposal made little progress in 
Congress until the Justice Department, through Antonin Scalia, abandoned its 
opposition, clearing the way for the proposal to become the 1976 amendment 
to the APA. 
                                                                                                                     
 59 Scanwell Labs., Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see also 
Kingsbrook Jewish Med. Ctr. v. Richardson, 486 F.2d 663, 668 (2d Cir. 1973) (quoting 
Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436, 445 (2d Cir. 1969)) (noting that the APA waives federal 
sovereign immunity), abrogated by Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402 
(1993); Estrada v. Ahrens, 296 F.2d 690, 698 (5th Cir. 1961) (“The [APA] . . . makes a 
clear waiver of sovereign immunity . . . .”). 
 60 Littell v. Morton, 445 F.2d 1207, 1212–13 (4th Cir. 1971); see also Washington v. 
Udall, 417 F.2d 1310, 1320 (9th Cir. 1969) (holding that the APA does not waive federal 
sovereign immunity); Motah v. United States, 402 F.2d 1, 2 (10th Cir. 1968) (same); Twin 
Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minn. Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d 529, 532 (8th Cir. 
1967) (same); Cyrus v. United States, 226 F.2d 416, 417 (1st Cir. 1955) (same). 
 61 Littell, 445 F.2d at 1213. 
 62 See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 29, at 1662 n.234 (noting that the decision in Idaho v. 
Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997) shows that courts continue to mishandle 
nonstatutory review “by failing to maintain a proper consciousness of its falsity”). 
 63 See, e.g., Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1550–54 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (Scalia, J., dissenting), vacated, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985). 
 64 See Siegel, supra note 29, at 1664–65. 
 65 Id. at 1665. 
 66 See infra text accompanying notes 75, 83. 
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Congress created ACUS in 1966 to study the problems federal agencies 
face, “exchange information, and develop recommendations for action” in 
order to protect private rights and carry out federal responsibilities 
expeditiously.67 To those ends, Congress gave ACUS the power to study and 
make recommendations concerning “the efficiency, adequacy, and fairness of 
the administrative procedure” in federal agencies, and to collect and facilitate 
the exchange of information among agencies.68 
ACUS engages a broad range of people in a public deliberative process.69 
Its deliberation on the proposal to add a waiver of sovereign immunity to the 
APA engaged the Conference’s then-eighty-two members, who at the time 
included the Chairman, officials from thirty-three federal agencies, other 
individuals appointed by the President, and other members appointed by the 
Chairman to “provide broad representation of the views of private citizens and 
utilize diverse experience.”70 ACUS also engaged “agency and departmental 
officials, judges, scholars, practitioners, and bar associations” in its 
deliberations about sovereign immunity.71  
The Chairman in 1970, Jerre Williams, explained that the sovereign 
immunity proposal grew out of “a great deal of discussion, correspondence, 
debate, consultation, drafting, redrafting, and, of course, painstaking legal 
research.”72 ACUS employed Professor Roger Cramton as a consultant to help 
develop the proposal.73 He produced a lengthy report and developed the text of 
the proposal.74 Throughout the process, ACUS coordinated with the ABA and 
the Department of Justice, as well as other federal agencies, judges, and law 
professors.75 ACUS finalized its recommendation in October, 1969.76 Because 
the proposal had been so thoroughly vetted, the Chairman was confident that it 
“would appeal to a broad range of responsible opinion in and out of 
Government.”77 
                                                                                                                     
 67 Administrative Conference Act § 571, 5 U.S.C. § 591 (2012). 
 68 Id. § 594. 
 69 Kathryn E. Kovacs, Superstatute Theory and Administrative Common Law, 90 IND. 
L.J. 1207, 1247–48 (2015). 
 70 5 U.S.C. § 593; see also 1970 Hearing, supra note 32, at 8 (statement of Jerre S. 
Williams, Chairman, ACUS) (noting that 82 members of the Assembly, which includes 
“high officials from 33 agencies and departments,” considered S. 3568). 
 71 1970 Hearing, supra note 32, at 8 (statement of Jerre S. Williams). 
 72 Id. at 10. 
 73 Id. at 16 (comment of Roger C. Cramton). 
 74 See generally Cramton Memo, supra note 32, at 92–156. 
 75 1970 Hearing, supra note 32, at 14 (statement of Ashley Sellers, Chairman, 
Judicial Review Comm.); Cramton Memo, supra note 32, at 116; Admin. Conference of 
the U.S., Sovereign Immunity Recommendation Discussed (Oct. 21, 1969), as reprinted in 
1970 Hearing, supra note 32, app. V, at 237 (transcript from plenary session). 
 76 ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 69-1: STATUTORY REFORM 
OF THE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DOCTRINE (Oct. 1969), https://www.acus.gov/recommendati 
on/statutory-reform-sovereign-immunity-doctrine [https://perma.cc/XP65-VNHJ].  
 77 1970 Hearing, supra note 32, at 10 (statement of Jerre S. Williams). 
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The ABA endorsed the ACUS proposal on February 24, 1970,78 and 
ACUS worked with the staff of the Senate Judiciary Committee’s 
Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, chaired by Senator 
Edward M. Kennedy, to draft Senate Bill 3568.79 Senator Kennedy recognized 
that the bill grew out “of extensive deliberations by the Administrative 
Conference and the ABA.”80  
The bill was designed to accomplish three goals: 
 1. Eliminate the defense of sovereign immunity in suits for specific relief 
against the Federal Government.  
 2. Eliminate the present requirement of a minimum jurisdictional amount 
in United States district courts where a Federal question is involved.  
 3. Simplify and clarify the law relating to naming the United States, its 
agencies, or officers as parties defendant.81 
Section 10(a) of the APA already provided a cause of action: “A person 
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or 
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled 
to judicial review thereof.”82 The key provision of S. 3568 for purposes of this 
discussion was the proposed addition to section 10(a) of the following waiver 
of sovereign immunity:  
An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money 
damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof 
acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority 
shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is 
against the United States or that the United States is an indispensable party.83 
It was understood from the beginning that adding this waiver to the APA 
would not affect other common law defenses available to the government, like 
ripeness and exhaustion.84 ACUS proposed including a savings clause 
following the waiver, which is now the final sentence of § 702:  
                                                                                                                     
 78 Proceedings of the 1970 Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates, 95 ANN. REP. 
A.B.A. 123, 149–50 (1970); see also 1970 Hearing, supra note 32, at 56 (statement of Dan 
M. Byrd, Chairman, Administrative Law Section, American Bar Association). 
 79 S. 3568, 91st Cong. (1970); see also 1970 Hearing, supra note 32, at 6, 8 
(statement of Jerre S. Williams). 
 80 1970 Hearing, supra note 32, at 3 (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy). 
 81 Id. at 2. 
 82 Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 10(a), 60 Stat. 243 (1946) 
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012)). 
 83 S. 3568.  
 84 In Darby v. Cisneros, the Supreme Court held that the APA requires exhaustion of 
administrative remedies “only when expressly required by statute or when an agency rule 
requires appeal before review and the administrative action is made inoperative pending 
that review.” Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 154 (1993). 
1166 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 77:6 
Nothing herein (1) affects other limitations on judicial review or the power or 
duty of the court to dismiss any action or deny relief on any other appropriate 
legal or equitable ground; or (2) confers authority to grant relief if any other 
statute that grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief 
which is sought.85 
In his report for ACUS, Professor Cramton explained that the savings 
clause would ensure that the waiver would “not result in undue judicial 
interference with governmental operations or a flood of burdensome litigation” 
because common law justiciability doctrines would remain available.86 
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, who chaired the ABA committee on this issue, 
wrote an article that took a parallel tack.87 The report of the ABA’s 
Administrative Law Section stated similarly that “all law other than the law of 
sovereign immunity is unchanged.”88 Thus, cases that previously would have 
been dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds might still be dismissed on 
other grounds, including ripeness and exhaustion.89 
It was also understood from the beginning that including the waiver in the 
APA instead of the Judicial Code in Title 28 would, as Professor Cramton 
said, “limit[] the effect of the recommendation in important respects.”90 First, 
the waiver would be subject to the exceptions to the definition of “agency” in 
§ 701; the proposal was not meant to override prior congressional judgments 
about which agencies or functions should be exempt from the APA’s judicial 
review provisions.91 Second, by incorporating the waiver in the APA, “the 
general law governing the availability and scope of judicial review,”  as 
“codified in 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–06,” would give context to the proposal and 
clarify its limited nature.92 For example, judicial review would remain 
unavailable pursuant to § 701(a) where “statutes preclude judicial review” or 
“agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.”93 Additionally, 
courts would retain their equitable authority “to balance the interests of the 
parties in deciding what kind of relief is appropriate” and, under § 705, to 
preserve the status quo pending judicial review.94 Finally, adding a waiver of 
sovereign immunity to the APA would not allow judges “to substitute their 
judgment for that of administrators” because judicial review would be limited 
by § 706’s provisions governing the scope of review.95 The ABA report 
agreed that by adding the waiver to § 702, “it will be applicable only when that 
                                                                                                                     
 85 ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 76; see also 5 U.S.C. § 702. 
 86 Cramton Memo, supra note 32, at 131. 
 87 Id. at 201–23. 
 88 Report of the Section of Administrative Law, 95 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 342, 345 (1970). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Cramton Memo, supra note 32, at 118. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 119. 
 93 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2012); Cramton Memo, supra note 32, at 119. 
 94 5 U.S.C. § 705; Cramton Memo, supra note 32, at 136. 
 95 Cramton Memo, supra note 32, at 137. 
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provision is applicable.”96 Specifically, the standards of review in § 706 would 
continue to constrain courts.97 
Senator Kennedy’s Subcommittee held a hearing on S. 3568 on June 3, 
1970.98 Kennedy stood firmly in support of the proposal99 but acknowledged 
its limitations. He understood that the bill would not affect other common law 
defenses, like ripeness and exhaustion.100 And he understood that the waiver 
would “not expand the scope of judicial review, which remains limited by the 
[APA].”101 
The Justice Department opposed the bill. William D. Ruckelshaus, 
Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division, testified in opposition to the 
proposal because he thought it would spur “litigation on the merits of large 
numbers of cases incapable of being accurately classified.”102 He pointed out 
that courts need not “decide every dispute in our society”; there are other 
forums to redress grievances.103 Sovereign immunity doctrine, he said, gives 
Congress the responsibility to decide which agency actions should be 
judicially reviewable.104 “[I]nstead of using a shotgun,” he thought, “a rifle 
would be a better approach.”105 Hence, he supported the proposal that later 
became the Quiet Title Act because it was sufficiently specific.106 The 
“sweeping nature” of S. 3568, in contrast, would “open up the whole 
decisionmaking process of the administrative branch to judicial review,” thus 
spurring “a flood of cases.”107  
Professor Davis tried to influence DOJ to change its position,108 but the 
Department stood firm, and the proposal languished for several years. As 
Senator Kennedy later explained, opposition from the administration and 
                                                                                                                     
 96 Report of the Section of Administrative Law, supra note 88, at 345.  
 97 Id. Professor Davis’s article used the same language. Davis, supra note 49, at 222. 
 98 See generally 1970 Hearing, supra note 32. The hearing lasted two and a half hours 
and generated a transcript of 260 pages. Id. at 1, 75. 
 99 Id. at 1 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (“The doctrine that ‘the King can do no 
wrong’ . . . has no place in 20th-century America.”). 
 100 Id. at 3; see also id. at 75. 
 101 122 CONG. REC. 22011 (1976) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); see also 1970 
Hearing, supra note 32, at 2 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (“The scope of judicial review is 
in no way expanded. It remains limited by section 706 of title 5.”). 
 102 1970 Hearing, supra note 32, at 66 (statement of William D. Ruckelshaus). 
 103 Id. at 65. 
 104 Id. at 66. 
 105 Id. at 68. 
 106 Id. at 66, 69. 
 107 Id. at 66–67; Letter from William D. Ruckelshaus, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of 
Justice, to Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman, U.S. Senate Subcomm. on Admin. Practice & 
Procedure (July 8, 1970), in 1970 Hearing, supra note 32, app. VI, at 255, 256. 
 108 Letter from Kenneth Culp Davis to Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman, U.S. Senate 
Subcomm. on Admin. Practice & Procedure (Apr. 21, 1970), in 1970 Hearing, supra note 
32, app. VI, at 246, 246–47; see also Report of the Section of Administrative Law, supra 
note 88, at 343–46. 
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Senator Ervin prevented S. 3568 from reporting out of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee.109 
Then Antonin Scalia entered the picture. Scalia served as Chairman of 
ACUS from 1972 to 1974 and was confirmed as Assistant Attorney General 
for DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel on August 22, 1974, shortly after Gerald 
Ford became President.110 Scalia was the key to the passage of the 1976 
amendment. 
Senator Kennedy’s subcommittee held a hearing on April 28 and May 3, 
1976, which included almost five hours of testimony.111 The subcommittee 
considered fourteen bills, including S. 800 and S. 2407, both of which would 
have added a waiver of sovereign immunity to section 10(a) of the APA.112 S. 
800 was “nearly identical” to the bill that had failed in 1970.113 Again, the 
ABA supported the bill, as did ACUS.114 
Antonin Scalia testified for DOJ on April 28th.115 He reported that the 
Department had “undertaken a thoroughgoing reexamination” of its position 
on the sovereign immunity proposal at the urging of the Senate 
subcommittee’s staff and ACUS, but he was not prepared to discuss the matter 
yet.116 On May 10th, Scalia submitted DOJ’s views by letter to Senator 
Kennedy.117 “In light of the tenacious and well reasoned support of this 
proposal by such knowledgeable and responsible organizations as the [ACUS] 
and the [ABA],” he said, the Department was prepared to endorse S. 800 with 
“a number of caveats concerning its proper interpretation.”118 First, it was 
Scalia’s understanding that the bill would not throw open the courthouse doors 
for all claims that previously had been dismissed due to sovereign 
immunity.119 He said: 
                                                                                                                     
 109 Cramton Memo, supra note 32, at 155. 
 110 See 120 CONG. REC. 29776 (1974); Former Chairmen, ADMIN. CONF. U.S., 
https://www.acus.gov/contacts/former-chairmen [https://perma.cc/MT78-DTHC]. 
 111 1976 Hearing, supra note 56, at 126–27, 258. A subcommittee of the House 
Judiciary Committee held a hearing on December 4, 1975, which covered several different 
proposals and lasted only about an hour. Administrative Procedure: Hearing on H.R. 
10194, H.R. 10195, H.R. 10196, H.R. 10197, H.R. 10198, and H.R. 10199 Before the 
Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
94th Cong. 1, 75 (1975). Representatives of the ABA and ACUS again testified in support 
of House Bill 10199, which paralleled the failed Senate Bill 3568. Id. at 25, 28, 40. 
 112 1976 Hearing, supra note 56, at 1, 4. 
 113 S. REP. NO. 94-996, at 19 (1976). 
 114 See 1976 Hearing, supra note 56, at 71 (statement of William Ross, Chairman, 
Comm. on Revision, Administrative Law Section, American Bar Association); id. at 221, 
230–32 (statement of Richard K. Berg, Exec. Secretary, Administrative Conf. of the United 
States). 
 115 Id. at 87 (statement of Antonin Scalia, Assistant Att’y Gen.). 
 116 Id. at 92. 
 117 Letter from Scalia to Kennedy, supra note 42, at 24. 
 118 Id. at 25.  
 119 Id. 
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To the contrary, one of the very premises of the proposal is the fact that many 
(indeed, I would say most) of the cases disposed of on the basis of sovereign 
immunity could have been decided the same way on other legal grounds, such 
as: lack of standing; lack of ripeness . . . [and] failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies . . . .120  
Scalia’s view that “common law doctrines”121 would remain available to 
the government was consistent with that of ACUS, the ABA, and Senator 
Kennedy.122 That view is also reflected in the Senate Report, which said that 
other defenses like standing, exhaustion, and ripeness would be unchanged and 
“provide a much more rational basis for controlling unnecessary judicial 
interference in administrative decisions.”123 
In addition to the continued applicability of those “common law 
[justiciability] doctrines,” Scalia said that “an important factor” in the 
Department’s support for the bill was the waiver’s inclusion in § 702.124 Since 
it was added to § 702, Scalia said, it would “only apply to claims relating to 
improper official action[] and will be subject to the other limitations of the 
[APA].”125 In particular, the exclusions in § 701(a) for cases in which judicial 
review is precluded by statute or action is committed to agency discretion 
would continue to apply, as would § 703’s provision that, where a statute 
specifies a form of proceeding, that form should be employed.126  
Scalia’s understanding of the proposed bill was consistent with the ACUS 
and ABA statements. When the Senate issued its report in June of 1976, 
however, its statement was significantly narrower. The Report said only that, 
because the waiver was added to § 702, it would apply “only to functions 
falling within the definition of ‘agency’ in 5 U.S.C. section 701,” and it would 
be subject to the exceptions in § 701(a).127 The House report was similar.128  
On the Senate floor, Senator Kennedy recognized the importance of 
Scalia’s involvement. He said that Scalia had “provided substantial momentum 
in recent years and weeks toward the refinement and ultimately the Judiciary 
Committee’s adoption of this bill.”129 Senator Hruska also indicated that the 
                                                                                                                     
 120 Id. at 25–26. 
 121 Id. at 26. 
 122 See supra text accompanying notes 86–88, 100. 
 123 S. REP. NO. 94-996, at 9 (1976); see also id. at 11. The House Report reflected the 
same understanding. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1656, at 3, 9–10, 12 (1976). 
 124 Letter from Scalia to Kennedy, supra note 42, at 26. 
 125 Id. 
 126 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a), 703 (2012); Letter from Scalia to Kennedy, supra note 42, at 
26. 
 127 S. REP. NO. 94-996, at 10. 
 128 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1656, at 11. 
 129 122 CONG. REC. 22012 (1976) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
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bill had moved only because of DOJ’s support.130 He read part of Scalia’s 
letter into the record and specifically noted that Scalia had “placed great 
weight on” ACUS’s recommendation, which had specified “that the 
waiver . . . be subject to the other limitations of the [APA].”131 The bill passed 
the Senate on July 1, 1976,132 the House on October 1, 1976,133 and President 
Ford signed it into law on October 21, 1976.134 
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE 1976 AMENDMENT 
The 1976 amendment added to the APA a waiver of the United States’ 
sovereign immunity from suits “seeking relief other than money damages.”135 
Congress’s effort to clarify the law, however, succeeded only in part. The 
question of how the 1976 amendment should be interpreted has generated 
intra- and inter-circuit splits and general confusion. By and large, the courts 
rely on the text of the waiver itself but ignore its statutory context. They rely 
on statements in the House and Senate Reports that the waiver is broad but 
ignore statements that it is limited. Most importantly, they ignore Congress’s 
deliberate decision to include the waiver in the APA instead of Title 28, and 
they ignore Scalia’s bargain with Senator Kennedy.  
This Part first addresses cases discussing the applicability of the waiver to 
non-APA claims, then cases discussing the related question of whether the 
waiver is subject to the other limitations in the APA. 
A. Applicability of the Waiver to Non-APA Claims 
1. Early Cases 
By 1983, the courts of appeals that had addressed the issue were 
unanimous that the waiver of sovereign immunity in § 702 applied to all 
actions brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the federal question jurisdiction 
statute. The courts in these early cases, however, failed to distinguish between 
subject matter jurisdiction, sovereign immunity, and causes of action, and they 
drew no distinction between cases using the APA’s cause of action and cases 
using other causes of action.  
Shortly after Congress enacted the 1976 amendment, the Second Circuit in 
Estate of Watson v. Blumenthal held that § 702 did not waive the 
                                                                                                                     
 130 Id. at 22014 (statement of Sen. Hruska) (“I feel it is important that the history . . . of 
the consideration of this bill, be registered so that the reasons for congressional action in 
this area of the law will be well understood.”). 
 131 Id.  
 132 Id. (general record). 
 133 Id. at 35113. 
 134 Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 702 
(2012)). 
 135 5 U.S.C. § 702. 
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government’s immunity in nonstatutory review suits founded on § 1331.136 
Watson’s estate sought declaratory and mandamus relief in a suit against the 
Secretary of the Treasury to redeem bonds to pay estate taxes.137 The court of 
appeals recognized that “an action under § 1331 seeking nonstatutory review 
of agency action is distinct from an action under the APA.”138 While the 1976 
amendment eliminated the defense of sovereign immunity in suits brought 
under the APA, the court said, it did not do so for “actions under § 1331.”139 
The Second Circuit’s analysis was flawed. The court correctly 
distinguished between nonstatutory review and APA cases. But the court 
conflated nonstatutory review and § 1331. Instead of saying that the waiver in 
§ 702 does not apply to “actions under § 1331,” it would have been more 
precise to say that the APA’s waiver applies only to APA claims.140 Perhaps it 
had not sunk in yet that, as the Supreme Court held the year before in Califano 
v. Sanders, the APA does not grant jurisdiction.141 Jurisdiction in APA cases 
usually is premised on § 1331.142 Thus, to say that the waiver in § 702 does 
not apply to suits under § 1331 is nonsensical. In any event, the Second Circuit 
held correctly that sovereign immunity barred the plaintiff’s non-APA 
claim.143  
The following year, the Third Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in 
Jaffee v. United States.144 Jaffee was injured by radiation from nuclear bomb 
testing while serving in the military.145 Among other things, he sought an 
order requiring the government to warn members of a class of the medical 
risks of their radiation exposure.146 The court of appeals disagreed with Estate 
of Watson and held “that section 702, when it applies, waives sovereign 
immunity in ‘nonstatutory’ review of agency action under section 1331.”147 
The court drew that conclusion from statements in the legislative history 
indicating that Congress intended the waiver to “facilitate 
nonstatutory . . . review.”148 
                                                                                                                     
 136 See generally Estate of Watson v. Blumenthal, 586 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1978), 
abandoned by Sprecher v. Graber, 716 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 137 Id. at 926. 
 138 Id. at 932. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107 (1977). 
 142 See BLACKLETTER STATEMENT, supra note 20, at 47. 
 143 In the alternative, the court held that the 1976 amendment did not affect the 
relegation of contract claims to the Court of Claims. Blumenthal, 586 F.2d at 933. Because 
the plaintiff’s claim was founded on a contract, the Court of Claims had exclusive 
jurisdiction. Id. at 929. 
 144 Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 145 Id. at 714. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. at 718. 
 148 Id. at 719 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1656, at 19 (1976)). 
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Unlike the Second Circuit, the Third Circuit did not recognize the 
distinction between nonstatutory review and APA claims. The term 
“nonstatutory review” was already a misnomer before the APA was enacted 
because every nonstatutory review case requires a statutory grant of 
jurisdiction.149 After 1946, courts used the term to refer to suits founded on the 
APA’s cause of action, but that is incorrect as well because such claims are 
authorized by the APA.150 Moreover, the court in Jaffee failed to appreciate 
that Jaffee’s claim may have been cognizable under the APA itself.151 If so, 
holding that the waiver in § 702 applied would have been unremarkable. 
Nonetheless, the court held that § 702 waived the government’s immunity 
from Jaffee’s suit.152 
A year later, the Fifth Circuit in Sheehan v. Army and Air Force Exchange 
Service, acknowledged the split between Estate of Watson and Jaffee, and 
sided with Jaffee, holding “that Congress did intend to waive the defense of 
sovereign immunity for nonstatutory review under section 1331.”153 Again, 
the court failed to distinguish between APA claims and non-APA claims. 
The Ninth Circuit also sided with the Third Circuit in Glines v. Wade.154 
Like the Third and Fifth Circuits, the Ninth Circuit failed to distinguish 
between APA claims and non-APA claims. Similarly, in Beller v. Middendorf 
the court held “that section 702 waives sovereign immunity for . . . action[s] 
brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 seeking nonmonetary relief.”155 The court 
acknowledged the circuit split but felt bound by the earlier circuit precedent in 
Glines v. Wade.156 
                                                                                                                     
 149 See Vermeule, supra note 31, at 1115. 
 150 Jack M. Beermann, Common Law and Statute Law in Administrative Law, 63 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 10 (2011); John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial 
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M. Stack, The Reviewability of the President’s Statutory Powers, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 
1192 n.106 (2009); Vermeule, supra note 31, at 1115. 
 151 See Jaffee, 592 F.2d at 719 (holding that the plaintiff challenged “agency action”). 
 152 In Johnsrud v. Carter, the court followed Jaffee and reiterated that the waiver in 
§ 702 applies in cases under § 1331. Johnsrud v. Carter, 620 F.2d 29, 30–32 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(raising constitutional, statutory, and common law claims, and seeking an injunction for the 
government to warn residents near Three Mile Island of the health dangers from radiation). 
 153 Sheehan v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 619 F.2d 1132, 1139 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(challenging discharge from employment as violating regulations and due process), rev’d, 
456 U.S. 728 (1982).  
 154 Glines v. Wade, 586 F.2d 675, 681 (9th Cir. 1978) (noting that in “actions seeking 
nonmonetary relief or actions claiming that a government official acted in violation of the 
Constitution or of statutory authority,” “Congress has either waived sovereign immunity or 
the doctrine does not apply”), rev’d sub nom. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980). 
 155 Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 797 (9th Cir. 1980), overruled by Witt v. Dep’t 
of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 156 Id. In Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation v. Board of 
Oil & Gas Conservation, the court held that the waiver in § 702 applies to suits brought 
2016] SCALIA’S BARGAIN 1173 
Then the Second Circuit reversed itself. In B.K. Instrument, Inc. v. United 
States, the court addressed a statutory claim regarding a losing bid for an 
electronic tool kits contract.157 Nonstatutory review was not available.158 
Without identifying the source of the plaintiff’s cause of action, the court said 
that “the Watson opinion was mistaken in advancing . . . that the 1976 
amendment to § 702 of the APA does not constitute . . . a [general] waiver” of 
sovereign immunity.159 The legislative history, the court noted, indicates that 
Congress intended “to eliminate the sovereign immunity defense in all 
equitable actions for specific relief against a Federal agency or officer acting 
in an official capacity.”160 
The B.K. Instrument court concluded correctly that Estate of Watson was 
wrong to hold that § 702 did not waive immunity in actions under § 1331.161 
The court’s analysis went awry, however, when it said that, after Califano v. 
Sanders, “there can be no action ‘brought under the APA,’” so the waiver in 
§ 702 must apply to claims under § 1331, otherwise it would be 
meaningless.162 The court should have distinguished between cases founded 
on the APA’s cause of action and those founded on other causes of action. The 
waiver in § 702 applies to cases brought using the APA’s cause of action and 
the jurisdictional grant in § 1331; it should not apply to cases brought using a 
different cause of action and the jurisdictional grant in § 1331. 
The D.C. Circuit also made broad statements about the applicability of the 
waiver in § 702 without distinguishing APA claims from non-APA claims. In 
Sea–Land Service, Inc. v. Alaska Railroad, the court stated that § 702 waives 
immunity in actions seeking injunctive relief under the Sherman Act and in 
general.163 In Schnapper v. Foley, the court held that in suits against federal 
officers for injunctive relief, “section 702 retains the defense of sovereign 
immunity only when another statute expressly or implicitly forecloses 
injunctive relief.”164 And in Clark v. Library of Congress, the court said that 
the 1976 amendment “eliminated the sovereign immunity defense in virtually 
all actions for non-monetary relief against a U.S. agency or officer acting in an 
                                                                                                                     
under 28 USC § 1362, which gives district courts jurisdiction over actions arising under 
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 162 B.K. Instrument, 715 F.2d at 725. 
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official capacity.”165 Thus, the early cases held uniformly that the waiver in 
§ 702 applies to all suits brought using the jurisdictional grant in § 1331, 
regardless of the source of the cause of action. These cases paid no heed to 
Scalia’s bargain to the contrary. 
2. Later Cases 
In the 1990s, the courts began to distinguish between cases founded on the 
APA’s cause of action and cases founded on other causes of action. Eventually 
the courts of appeals that addressed the issue reached unanimity on the holding 
that the waiver in § 702 applies to both APA claims and non-APA claims.166 
In Part IV I will explain why they are all wrong. 
Unfortunately, robust analysis of this issue is almost entirely absent from 
the case law. The most in-depth analysis came from the D.C. Circuit in 
Trudeau v. FTC, which concerned an FTC press release about the settlement 
of charges against Trudeau for false and misleading advertising.167 Trudeau 
filed suit challenging the press release, seeking declaratory and injunctive 
relief, alleging that the press release exceeded the agency’s statutory authority 
and violated his First Amendment rights.168 He raised claims under the APA 
and the First Amendment, and sought nonstatutory review.169 The government 
                                                                                                                     
 165 Clark v. Library of Cong., 750 F.2d 89, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 166 Courts have often made such statements in dicta. In 1993, for example, the Third 
Circuit announced that the waiver of sovereign immunity in § 702 “is not limited to suits 
brought under the APA.” Specter v. Garrett, 995 F.2d 404, 410 (3d Cir. 1993), rev’d sub 
nom. Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994). That statement was dicta because, as the 
court recognized, the plaintiff sought nonstatutory review, for which no waiver of 
sovereign immunity is required. Id. at 409–10 (holding that sovereign immunity is not a bar 
to suits challenging the constitutionality of executive action (citing Larson v. Domestic & 
Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 693 (1949))). The D.C. Circuit’s statement in 
Chamber of Commerce v. Reich that the waiver in § 702 “applies to any suit whether under 
the APA or not” was dicta for the same reason. Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 
1322, 1328–29 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[T]here is no sovereign immunity to waive—it never 
attached in the first place.”). In National Wrestling Coaches Ass’n. v. Department of 
Education, the D.C. Circuit reiterated that the waiver in § 702 “applies to any suit, whether 
advanced under the APA or not.” Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., 366 
F.3d 930, 947 (D.C. Cir. 2004). That statement was dicta as well because the plaintiffs 
lacked standing. Id. at 945; see also Gros Ventre Tribe v. United States, 469 F.3d 801, 808 
n.8 (9th Cir. 2006) (pointing out that the court in Chamber of Commerce, 74 F.3d 1322, did 
not reach the issue of whether § 702 is limited to APA claims). Sometimes courts of 
appeals state that the APA’s waiver applies to non-APA claims in cases concerning APA 
claims. See, e.g., Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 768, 775 (7th Cir. 
2011) (concerning an APA claim challenging the management of the Chicago Area 
Waterway System); Puerto Rico v. United States, 490 F.3d 50, 56, 57–58 (1st Cir. 2007) 
(concerning an APA claim challenging the FBI’s refusal to release records). 
 167 Trudeau v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 456 F.3d 178, 181 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 168 Id. at 180, 182. 
 169 Id. at 185. 
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argued that the waiver of sovereign immunity in § 702 applies only to APA 
claims, but the court disagreed, “holding that the ‘APA’s waiver of sovereign 
immunity applies to any suit.’”170 Thus, the waiver “permit[ted] not only 
Trudeau’s APA cause of action, but his nonstatutory and First Amendment 
actions as well.”171 The court premised its holding on the language of § 702, 
which the court held does not suggest such a restriction, and a brief discussion 
of the House and Senate Reports, which the court held confirm that Congress 
expected the waiver to apply to non-APA claims.172 Ultimately, the court held 
that all of Trudeau’s claims failed to state a claim because the press release 
was not false or misleading.173 
The court made many mistakes in Trudeau. Among others, the court erred 
in treating nonstatutory review as a cause of action. Nonstatutory review 
allows a court to hear a claim against the government without a waiver of 
sovereign immunity; it does not provide a cause of action.174 The Supreme 
Court distinguished the two requirements in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign 
Commerce Corp.175 To state a cause of action, the Court said, “the plaintiff 
[must] claim an invasion of his legal rights.”176 The plaintiff there claimed that 
the government’s sale of certain coal constituted conversion.177 In addition, 
when suing the federal government, “it must also appear that the action to be 
restrained or directed is not action of the sovereign.”178 Alleging that a 
government officer acted tortuously is not sufficient.179 So long as the officer 
acts within “the terms of his valid statutory authority,” he acts on behalf of the 
sovereign, and his action “cannot be enjoined or directed” absent a waiver of 
the sovereign’s immunity.180 If, however, the officer acts outside the scope of 
his statutory authority or unconstitutionally, the officer does not act on behalf 
of the sovereign, and no waiver of sovereign immunity is required.181 
                                                                                                                     
 170 Id. at 186 (quoting Chamber of Commerce, 74 F.3d at 1328). 
 171 Id. at 187. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Trudeau, 456 F.3d at 191, 197. 
 174 See Kovacs, supra note 17, at 113 (stating that the D.C. Circuit, in its holding in 
Chamber of Commerce, 74 F.3d 1322, “was off the mark when it linked Leedom and 
McAnnulty to stating a cause of action instead of identifying a waiver of sovereign 
immunity; the plaintiff in a nonstatutory review case must identify a cause of action”). 
 175 Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 693 (1949). 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. at 692. 
 178 Id. at 693. 
 179 Id. at 694. 
 180 Id. at 695; see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 112 
(1984). 
 181 Larson, 337 U.S. at 697 (distinguishing United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882)). 
Moreover, the Court has spoken of nonstatutory review in jurisdictional terms, which is 
inconsistent with the notion that it provides a cause of action. See Leedom v. Kyne, 358 
U.S. 184, 189, 191 (1958); Am. Sch. of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 108 
(1902); see also Larson, 337 U.S. at 690 & n.10 (noting that, in an action based on an ultra 
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The Trudeau court was also mistaken in thinking that it needed to answer 
the question of whether the waiver in § 702 applies to non-APA claims. 
Clearly the waiver applied to Trudeau’s APA claim, and no waiver was 
required for his First Amendment claim.182 Hence, the court’s conclusion that 
the waiver applies to non-APA claims was dicta. In any event, the court’s 
conclusion was flawed for the reasons explained in Part IV. 
The Federal Circuit followed Trudeau in Delano Farms Co. v. California 
Table Grape Commission.183 Grape growers filed a suit for declaratory relief 
challenging validity of the USDA’s patents on table grapes and its conduct in 
licensing and enforcing the patents.184 The court held that the waiver in § 702 
applies to claims arising under the Patent Act.185 Like the D.C. Circuit, the 
Federal Circuit observed that nothing in the text limits the waiver to APA 
claims, and it claimed that the legislative history “reinforces the breadth of the 
statutory language.”186 As explained in the next Part, Trudeau and Delano 
Farms failed to appreciate the waiver’s statutory context and ignored Scalia’s 
bargain. 
The Seventh Circuit’s consistent holding in Blagojevich v. Gates, was 
premised on the Supreme Court’s decision in Bowen v. Massachusetts, which 
the court of appeals believed “treated § 702 as governing when any federal 
statute authorizes review of agency action.”187 That view of Bowen, however, 
is wrong. Bowen concerned an APA claim;188 the substantive statute at issue, 
the Medicaid Act, did not provide for judicial review.189 The Court in Bowen 
held that a challenge to a Medicaid reimbursement decision was not a claim 
for “money damages.”190 Consequently, the Court held that the claim sought 
“relief other than money damages” as required by § 702 and was not barred 
under § 704 by the availability of an adequate remedy in the Court of 
Claims.191 Those holdings have no bearing on the question of whether the 
APA’s waiver applies to non-APA claims. 
The only other support the Seventh Circuit gave for its holding that the 
APA’s waiver applies to non-APA claims was its observation that the waiver 
appears in the same chapter as § 704, which the court said makes any final 
agency action reviewable “if either some statute other than the APA makes an 
                                                                                                                     
vires claim, whether the act was in fact ultra vires determines whether a court has 
jurisdiction). 
 182 See Larson, 337 U.S. at 689–90. 
 183 Delano Farms Co. v. Cal. Table Grape Comm’n, 655 F.3d 1337, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
 184 Id. at 1340, 1349 n.6. 
 185 Id. at 1344. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Blagojevich v. Gates, 519 F.3d 370, 372 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 188 Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 911 (1988) (noting that the district court 
had authority to grant relief under 5 U.S.C. § 706). 
 189 Id. at 885. 
 190 Id. at 893. 
 191 Id. at 891, 909–10. 
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action reviewable . . . or there is no alternative remedy specified by statute.”192 
But that is merely a restatement of the APA’s cause of action; an action falling 
within those terms states a claim under the APA.193 
Other cases have reached the same result, but with little or no discussion 
of the issue. The Sixth Circuit, for example, held that the APA’s waiver of 
sovereign immunity applies to non-APA causes of action.194 In United States 
v. City of Detroit, the district court, acting under the All Writs Act, ordered the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to accept dredged material to avoid frustrating 
a Clean Water Act consent judgment between the City of Detroit and the State 
of Michigan.195 The court of appeals rejected the United States’ argument that 
the waiver in § 702 applies only to APA claims.196 The court cited case law in 
support of that conclusion, but did not analyze the issue.197 Similarly, the 
Tenth Circuit in Simmat v. United States Bureau of Prisons, held that the 
waiver in § 702 applies to non-APA claims.198 There was an Eighth 
Amendment claim against prison dentists in their official capacities, but it did 
not discuss the issue.199 
Thus, the courts of appeals that have addressed the question have ignored 
Scalia’s bargain and concluded that the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity 
applies to claims founded on non-APA causes of action. In-depth analysis, 
however, is utterly lacking. 
B. Relation Between the Waiver and Other Parts of the APA 
On the question of how the waiver of sovereign immunity in § 702 relates 
to the other provisions of the APA, the courts of appeals are all over the map, 
as explained below. Clearly, this second question overlaps significantly with 
the first. If the waiver of sovereign immunity applies only to APA claims, a 
plaintiff using the waiver would have to satisfy the elements of an APA claim, 
such as the final agency action requirement.200 But this question is analytically 
distinct. Even if plaintiffs may use the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity to 
bring non-APA causes of action, as the courts of appeals have concluded, use 
of the waiver should still hinge on satisfying the other requirements of the 
                                                                                                                     
 192 Blagojevich, 519 F.3d at 372. 
 193 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012). 
 194 United States v. Detroit, 329 F.3d 515, 521 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 195 Id. at 517. 
 196 Id. at 521. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Simmat v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 413 F.3d 1225, 1233 (10th Cir. 2005).  
 199 Id. at 1233, 1236–38 (holding that the case was dismissed for a failure to follow the 
pleading requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act); see also We the People 
Found., Inc. v. United States, 485 F.3d 140, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that waiver in 
§ 702 applied to a First Amendment Petition Clause claim). 
 200 Cf. Reliable Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 324 F.3d 
726, 731 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“If there was no final agency action here, there is no doubt that 
appellant would lack a cause of action under the APA.”). 
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APA. Thus, some of the courts that have concluded that the APA’s waiver 
applies to non-APA claims have also concluded that plaintiffs employing the 
waiver must satisfy some of the elements of the APA’s cause of action.201 
1. “Agency Action” 
The Ninth Circuit in Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United States, held 
that the APA’s waiver is not limited to “agency action.”202 The plaintiff 
churches challenged the recording of church services by Immigration and 
Nationalization Service agents as a violation of the First and Fourth 
Amendments, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.203 The district court 
held that sovereign immunity barred all relief against the federal government, 
but the court of appeals disagreed.204 The court rejected the government’s 
argument that only the forms of “agency action” defined in § 551(13) of the 
APA can be challenged using the waiver in § 702, and the INS’s investigative 
activities do not constitute “agency action.”205 The court said that argument 
“offends the plain meaning of the amendment” and is unsupported in the 
legislative history.206 The waiver, the court said, “was clearly intended to 
cover the full spectrum of agency conduct, regardless of whether it fell within 
the technical definition of ‘agency action.’”207 The court did not account for 
the agreement between Scalia and Kennedy that the waiver would “be subject 
to the other limitations of the [APA].”208 
The Second and Sixth Circuits disagreed with the Ninth Circuit. In SEC v. 
Credit Bancorp, Ltd., the United States intervened in an SEC enforcement 
action against Credit Bancorp to protect related ongoing criminal 
proceedings.209 The district court ordered that debts to bank customers took 
priority over federal tax debt and that the receiver would incur no personal 
liability.210 The court of appeals held that the district court lacked jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                     
 201 See infra text accompanying notes 237–44. 
 202 Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United States, 870 F.2d 518, 525 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 203 Id. at 520–21. The churches also sought nominal damages, but only against 
individual officers. Id. at 521. 
 204 Id. at 521, 523–24. 
 205 Id. at 524. 
 206 Id. at 525. 
 207 Id.; see also Reno v. Am.–Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 510 n.4 
(1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that the waiver in § 702 is not limited to “final 
agency action” (citing Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 523–26)). The Federal Circuit in 
Delano Farms agreed that the waiver in § 702 is not limited to “agency action.” Delano 
Farms Co. v. Cal. Table Grape Comm’n, 655 F.3d 1337, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2011). But the 
court made that statement in the course of holding that the waiver is not limited to APA 
claims; the court did not address an argument that the action at issue did not constitute 
“agency action.” Id. 
 208 Letter from Scalia to Kennedy, supra note 42, at 26. 
 209 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 297 F.3d 127, 130 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 210 Id. at 129–30. 
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to enter that order because the waiver in § 702 “applies only when there has 
been an ‘agency action’ within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 551(13).”211 Since 
there was no agency action, the waiver was not applicable.212 In Blakely v. 
United States, the Sixth Circuit agreed that, “[b]y its own terms, § 702 only 
applies where the party seeks judicial review of agency action.”213 Neither 
court explained its conclusion further.  
2. “Final Agency Action” 
The courts are also divided on the closely related question of whether the 
waiver in § 702 is limited to actions challenging “final agency action” under 
§ 704. The Ninth Circuit is internally divided. Despite the earlier holding in 
Presbyterian Church that the APA’s waiver is not limited to “agency action” 
as defined in § 551(13),214 the panel in Tucson Airport Authority v. General 
Dynamics Corp., said that the waiver is limited to “[a]gency action made 
reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other 
adequate remedy in a court.”215 Notably, the plaintiff presented non-APA 
claims in that case, claims that the court held were contractual and thus 
“impliedly forbid[den]” by the Tucker Act.216 A different panel of the Ninth 
Circuit reached the same conclusion later the same year in Gallo Cattle Co. v. 
United States Department of Agriculture, where a milk producer challenged 
the denial of a request to pay certain assessments into escrow pending the 
resolution of administrative proceedings.217 Without specifying the source of 
the claim, the court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the 
plaintiff did not challenge “final agency action.”218  
In 2006, the panel in Gros Ventre Tribe v. United States recognized the 
intra-circuit conflict between Presbyterian Church and Gallo Cattle—it did 
not mention Tucson Airport Authority—but declined to resolve the issue 
because the plaintiffs brought an APA claim and thus had to satisfy the APA’s 
requirements anyway.219 The panel in Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 
purported to resolve the issue, siding with Presbyterian Church in holding that 
the waiver is not limited to “final agency action” and distinguishing Gallo 
                                                                                                                     
 211 Id. at 141. 
 212 Id. 
 213 Blakely v. United States, 276 F.3d 853, 870 (6th Cir. 2002). The plaintiffs claimed 
that § 702 waived the government’s immunity from their request for the return of forfeited 
assets. Id. The court of appeals held that, “[b]ecause the instant forfeiture took place in the 
context of a civil judicial proceeding, there is no agency action for the district court or this 
Court to review.” Id. 
 214 Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United States, 870 F.2d 518, 525 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 215 Tucson Airport Auth. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 136 F.3d 641, 645 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(alteration in original) (quoting § 704). 
 216 Id. at 647. 
 217 Gallo Cattle Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 159 F.3d 1194, 1195–96 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 218 Id. at 1198–200. 
 219 Gros Venture Tribe v. United States, 469 F.3d 801, 808–09 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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Cattle as concerning an APA claim.220 But the court took the case en banc, 
vacated the panel’s opinion, and held that the district court lacked jurisdiction 
under the Veterans Judicial Review Act.221 Hence the Ninth Circuit’s internal 
split persists. 
Other courts agree with Tucson Airport Authority that the waiver is limited 
to “final agency action,” but they reach that conclusion in cases like Gallo 
Cattle in which the plaintiff either asserted or probably could have asserted an 
APA claim.222 Clearly, APA claims are subject to the limitations of § 704, so 
saying the waiver is subject to those limitations in cases concerning APA 
claims could simply reflect the courts’ failure to distinguish the cause of action 
from the waiver of sovereign immunity. For example, the Fourth Circuit in 
Food Town Stores, Inc. v. EEOC held that the waiver in § 702 is limited to 
“final agency action.”223 The plaintiff there sought to force the EEOC to issue 
a subpoena in an employment discrimination investigation of the plaintiff, 
arguing that the agency’s subpoena regulation conflicted with the relevant 
statute.224 If that was an APA claim, it is unremarkable for the court to have 
held that the plaintiff could only challenge “final agency action.” The court did 
not specify the source of the right of action. Similarly, in Blagojevich v. Gates, 
the Seventh Circuit declined to decide whether the governor’s challenge of a 
decision to move Air National Guard planes out of state was cognizable under 
the APA or not because the court believed the waiver in § 702 applied 
regardless.225 Nonetheless, the court held that the waiver in § 702 is limited to 
“final agency action” under § 704.226  
Most courts of appeals disagree. In Trudeau, in which the D.C. Circuit 
held that the waiver in § 702 is not limited to APA claims, the court also held 
that the waiver is not limited to “final agency action.”227 The court reasoned 
that, because § 704 does not grant jurisdiction, the “final agency action” 
requirement is not jurisdictional, but is merely an element of an APA claim.228 
And the waiver in § 702 “applies regardless of whether the elements of an 
APA cause of action are satisfied.”229 The court found nothing in the language 
of § 702 or the legislative history to indicate that the waiver is limited to “final 
                                                                                                                     
 220 Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 644 F.3d 845, 865–66 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 221 Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 678 F.3d 1013, 1013 (9th Cir. 2012) (en 
banc). 
 222 See Beamon v. Brown, 125 F.3d 965, 967 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating in a case 
concerning an APA claim that the waiver in § 702 is limited to “final agency action”). 
 223 Food Town Stores, Inc. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 708 F.2d 920, 922 
(4th Cir. 1983). 
 224 Id. at 921. 
 225 Blagojevich v. Gates, 519 F.3d 370, 371, 372 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 226 Id. at 372. 
 227 Trudeau v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 456 F.3d 178, 186, 187 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 228 Id. at 184. 
 229 Id. at 187. 
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agency action.”230 Clearly, the D.C. Circuit did not understand the significance 
of Scalia’s letter of May 10, 1976. 
The Federal Circuit agreed with Trudeau in Delano Farms.231 As 
explained above, the court held that the waiver applies to non-APA claims and 
is not limited to “agency action.”232 The court also held that it is not limited to 
“final agency action” under § 704.233 The court agreed with the D.C. Circuit 
that nothing in text limits the waiver to “final agency action,” and the 
legislative history “reinforces the breadth of the statutory language.”234 The 
Third and Sixth Circuits agreed, albeit in cases concerning APA claims.235 The 
Seventh Circuit joined the chorus, also in a case concerning an APA claim and 
without acknowledging the earlier panel’s contrary holding in Blagojevich v. 
Gates.236 
3. “No Other Adequate Remedy” 
Although the D.C. Circuit and the Federal Circuit have said that the 
waiver of sovereign immunity in § 702 is not limited to APA claims and is not 
constrained by the “final agency action” requirement in § 704, both courts 
have concluded that the waiver is limited to actions for which there is “no 
other adequate remedy in a court” under § 704. In National Wrestling Coaches 
Ass’n v. Department of Education, the D.C. Circuit said, without explanation, 
that § 702’s waiver “applies to any suit, whether advanced under the APA or 
not,” but “is limited by the ‘adequate remedy’ bar” in § 704.237 The court’s 
primary holding, however, was that the plaintiffs lacked standing,238 making 
the statement about the waiver dicta. 
The Federal Circuit’s statement to the same effect in Christopher Village, 
L.P. v. United States, was not dicta.239 Christopher Village requested a rent 
                                                                                                                     
 230 Id.  
 231 See Delano Farms Co. v. Cal. Table Grape Comm’n, 655 F.3d 1337, 1344 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011). 
 232 Id. 
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. 
 235 Muniz-Muniz v. U.S. Border Patrol, 741 F.3d 668, 673 (6th Cir. 2013); Treasurer 
of N.J. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 684 F.3d 382, 393, 397–400 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 236 Compare Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 768–69, 775 (7th 
Cir. 2011) (limiting waiver to final agency action), with Blagojevich v. Gates, 519 F.3d 
370, 372 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that waiver was not limited to final agency action). 
 237 Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 947 (D.C. Cir. 
2004). 
 238 Id. at 945. 
 239 Christopher Vill., L.P. v. United States, 360 F.3d 1319, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see 
also Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. United States, 590 F.3d 1357, 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(assuming that the “no other adequate remedy” provision in § 704 limits the waiver in 
§ 702, but holding that it did not apply in that case); Telecare Corp. v. Leavitt, 409 F.3d 
1345, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating in a case concerning an APA claim that the waiver in 
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increase for its federally subsidized low-income housing development.240 The 
Fifth Circuit held that the Department of Housing and Urban Development had 
violated its contract with Christopher Village by refusing to consider the rent 
increase request.241 Christopher Village then filed suit in the Court of Federal 
Claims (CFC) for breach of contract, arguing that the Fifth Circuit’s judgment 
precluded the government from relitigating its liability.242 The Federal Circuit 
said that the APA’s waiver is limited “to situations in which ‘no other 
adequate remedy’ exists.”243 A damages action in the CFC would have been 
an adequate remedy for Christopher Village, so the district court (and the Fifth 
Circuit) lacked jurisdiction, and their holdings did not have preclusive 
effect.244  
Later in Delano Farms, the court distinguished Christopher Village as 
concerning an APA claim, which was necessarily subject to the limits in 
§ 704.245 What the Delano Farms panel failed to recognize, however, was that 
the Christopher Village panel held that the district court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction; holding that Christopher Village did not have a cause of action 
under the APA would not have mattered for the preclusion question before the 
Federal Circuit.246 Thus, the holding in Christopher Village that the waiver in 
§ 702 is limited to actions for which there is “no other adequate remedy” in a 
court247 is binding circuit precedent. 
IV. WHERE THE COURTS WENT WRONG 
The majority of courts of appeals have misinterpreted the 1976 
amendment. The waiver should be interpreted to apply only to APA claims 
and to be limited by the other constraints in the APA, including the “final 
agency action”248 requirement. This result flows from the plain language of 
the waiver. The second sentence of § 702 should not be read in isolation, but 
rather in the context of the rest of § 702 and the surrounding sections of the 
APA.249 Even if the text were not clear, however, the history of the 1976 
amendment confirms that the waiver did not throw open the courthouse doors 
as wide as the majority of courts believe. 
                                                                                                                     
§ 702 is limited by the “adequate remedy” requirement in § 704); Smith v. Sec’y of the 
Army, 384 F.3d 1288, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (same).  
 240 Christopher Vill., 360 F.3d at 1322. 
 241 Id. at 1324. 
 242 Id. at 1324, 1326. 
 243 Id. at 1327 (quoting Bowen v. Massachussetts, 487 U.S. 879, 902 (1988)). 
 244 Id. at 1329, 1333.  
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 246 See Christopher Vill., 360 F.3d at 1329–30. 
 247 Id. at 1327. 
 248 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012). 
 249 Id. § 702.  
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My argument here should appeal to textualists and intentionalists alike. I 
believe that the text of § 702 is unambiguous, and one need not consult 
extrinsic materials to conclude that the waiver applies only to APA claims and 
is contingent on the other requirements in the APA. Even if one disagrees with 
that conclusion, however, at most the text is ambiguous, and the history of the 
1976 amendment provides compelling support for my interpretation. In other 
words, I do not argue here that the statutory history overrides the text, but 
rather that the history is reflected in the text.250 
A. Text 
Section 702 in its entirety reads:  
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely 
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant 
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof. An action in a court of the 
United States seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim 
that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an 
official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor 
relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States or 
that the United States is an indispensable party. The United States may be 
named as a defendant in any such action, and a judgment or decree may be 
entered against the United States: Provided, That any mandatory or 
injunctive decree shall specify the Federal officer or officers (by name or by 
title), and their successors in office, personally responsible for compliance. 
Nothing herein (1) affects other limitations on judicial review or the power or 
duty of the court to dismiss any action or deny relief on any other appropriate 
legal or equitable ground; or (2) confers authority to grant relief if any other 
statute that grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief 
which is sought.251 
Read in context, the “claim that an agency … acted or failed to act”252 in 
the second sentence of § 702 should be read to refer to “agency action” in the 
first sentence.253 In other words, the first sentence creates a right of review for 
any person harmed by “agency action.” The second sentence then waives the 
government’s sovereign immunity from claims challenging “agency action,” 
but only where the claim is “that an agency or an officer or employee thereof 
                                                                                                                     
 250 If one believes that the courts of appeals have adopted the “best reading of the 
statute,” then the 1976 amendment reflects a “legislative process failure[]” insofar as “most 
legislators . . . understood the meaning specified in legislative history,” that is, in Scalia’s 
letter. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Process Failure Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 56 WM. 
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 251 5 U.S.C. § 702. 
 252 Id. 
 253 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 21. 
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acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal 
authority.”254 Necessarily, the government’s immunity is only waived in 
actions challenging “agency action” under the first sentence of § 702.  
It is simply bizarre to read the middle sentence of § 702 as a stand-alone 
provision that waives the government’s immunity from any cause of action in 
the U.S. Code. If Congress wanted to create such a stand-alone waiver, it 
could have included that sentence in Title 28 with the other amendments in the 
bill. Instead, it added the sentence to Title 5 and, even more tellingly, placed it 
immediately following the APA’s right of action.255 The natural reading of the 
section as a whole links the waiver in the second sentence to the right of action 
in the first sentence. Thus, the majority of courts of appeals are simply 
misinterpreting (or ignoring) the plain language of the APA based on their 
misunderstanding of statements in the legislative history.256 
The courts also fail to acknowledge established Supreme Court doctrine 
governing the interpretation of waivers of sovereign immunity. The Court has 
repeated that waivers “of the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity must 
be unequivocally expressed in statutory text.”257 Even if reasonable minds 
could disagree about the plain language of the waiver in § 702, it does not 
unequivocally waive the government’s immunity from non-APA claims. 
According to the Supreme Court, any ambiguity in the statute must be read in 
favor of the government’s immunity.258  
B. History 
If a waiver of sovereign immunity “is not clearly evident from the 
language of the statute,” legislative history cannot tip the scales against the 
government.259 In the case of § 702, however, the legislative history favors the 
                                                                                                                     
 254 5 U.S.C. § 702. 
 255 Id. 
 256 See supra Part III.A. 
 257 Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996); see also Fed. Aviation Admin. v. Cooper, 
132 S. Ct. 1441, 1448 (2012) (discussing waiver of sovereign immunity). The normative 
validity of that rule is questionable. Abbe Gluck and Lisa Bressman’s groundbreaking 
empirical study of statutory drafting in Congress undermined the assumption that rules of 
statutory interpretation evince a dialogue between the courts and Congress. Abbe R. Gluck 
& Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of 
Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 942, 
945–46 (2013). For example, the people who draft statutes in Congress do not “know, use, 
or understand” the rule requiring express statutory language to abrogate a state’s immunity 
from suit. Id. at 946. They are thus not likely to be aware of the federal analog to that rule 
either. Moreover, as I previously argued, federal sovereign immunity doctrine is 
anachronistic and redundant and “should be left to gather dust.” Kovacs, supra note 17, at 
79. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has not yet seen fit to agree with me. The rule 
requiring express statutory language to waive the federal government’s sovereign 
immunity is still binding on the lower federal courts. 
 258 Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1448. 
 259 Id. 
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government. The courts of appeals are not giving sufficient weight to the 
deliberation underlying the 1976 amendment. The courts are only seeing one 
side of the picture: the side that promoted a broad waiver to overcome the 
problems with nonstatutory review. The courts are not accounting for the fact 
that the amendment only passed when the administration withdrew its 
opposition premised on a much more restrictive view of the waiver’s effect.260  
The courts’ primary mistake is in looking only at the House and Senate 
Reports and ignoring the broader deliberative process. First, the courts assert 
that nothing in the language of the waiver indicates that it is limited by other 
provisions of the APA.261 What the courts ignore, however, is that Congress 
could have added the waiver to Title 28; the bill included amendments to 
§§ 1331 and 1391 in Title 28.262 Instead, Congress amended § 702 in Title 5, 
thus implying that the waiver is connected to the other provisions in that 
chapter.263 The House and Senate Reports do not explain the decision to place 
the amendment in Title 5 Chapter 7, but the ACUS and ABA reports make 
clear that the decision was intended to limit the effect of the waiver.264 Senator 
Kennedy understood that; the Justice Department’s support was premised on 
that understanding; and Senator Hruska explained that on the Senate floor 
immediately before the bill passed.265 
Second, the courts rely on statements in the House and Senate Reports 
“that Congress intended [for the amendment] to waive immunity for ‘any’ and 
‘all’ actions for equitable relief against an agency.”266 Those broad statements, 
however, do not reflect the entirety of the deliberative process that led to the 
                                                                                                                     
 260 See supra text accompanying notes 110–34. 
 261 Delano Farms Co. v. Cal. Table Grape Comm’n, 655 F.3d 1337, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (“[N]othing in the text of section 702 limits its scope to ‘agency action,’ as defined 
in section 704 of the APA, or ‘final agency action,’ for which section 704 of the APA 
directly provides the right to judicial review.”); Trudeau v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 456 F.3d 
178, 186 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“There is nothing in the language of the second sentence of 
§ 702 that restricts its waiver to suits brought under the APA.”); Presbyterian Church 
(U.S.A.) v. United States, 870 F.2d 518, 525 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that nothing in the 
text limits waiver to “agency action”). 
 262 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1391 (2012). 
 263 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). 
 264 See supra text accompanying notes 90–97. The views of the ACUS and the ABA 
are particularly important here because they drafted the legislation. See William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 632–34 (1990) (discussing 
consideration of statements by nonlegislators in statutory interpretation). 
 265 See supra text accompanying notes 129–34. 
 266 Trudeau, 456 F.3d at 187 (citations omitted) (first quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1656, 
at 3, 9 (1976); and then quoting S. REP. NO. 94-996, at 8 (1976)); see id. at 186 (pointing to 
House and Senate Reports as identifying the purpose of the amendment to eliminate “the 
sovereign immunity defense in all equitable actions for specific relief against a Federal 
agency or officer acting in an official capacity” (quoting Sea–Land Serv., Inc. v. Alaska 
R.R., 659 F.2d 243, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1981))); see also Treasurer of N.J. v. U.S. Dep’t of the 
Treasury, 684 F.3d 382, 400 (3d Cir. 2012); Delano Farms Co., 655 F.3d at 1345; 
Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 525. 
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amendment’s passage.267 As detailed above, the Justice Department’s support 
for the bill was premised on the understanding that the waiver would be 
subject to the other limitations of the APA. That understanding was consistent 
with that of the organizations that proposed the amendment and with that of 
the chair of the relevant Senate subcommittee. Absent that understanding, the 
bill would have continued to languish.268  
Third, the courts point out “that Congress expected the waiver to apply to 
nonstatutory actions, and thus not only to actions under the APA.”269 Professor 
Cramton was the source of the statement in the Senate Report that the bill was 
designed to effectuate a “partial elimination of sovereign immunity, as a 
barrier to nonstatutory review.”270 He used that exact language when 
describing the ACUS proposal.271 As explained above, however, courts 
continued to use the term “nonstatutory review” to refer to claims founded on 
the APA’s cause of action, even though it was a misnomer.272 Importantly, 
Cramton’s report made clear that the waiver would be limited by the other 
provisions of the APA.273 The amendment was not written to overturn 
Larson274 and Dugan275 or to codify the requirements for officer suits. If it had 
been, it would have made more sense to include it in Title 28 with the rest of 
the amendments in the bill. Instead, the amendment was written to modify the 
APA itself by clarifying that sovereign immunity would not bar APA claims 
                                                                                                                     
 267 Those broad statements are also inconsistent with the Senate Judiciary Committee’s 
estimation that the bill would not require additional appropriations because it would 
expand the government’s caseload only “slightly.” S. REP. NO. 94-996, at 19; see also Lisa 
Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An 
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. 
L. REV. 725, 763–65 (2014) (empirical study finding that budget estimates influence 
statutory drafting). 
 268 See infra Part II.B.  
 269 Trudeau, 456 F.3d at 186; see also Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 525; Jaffee v. 
United States, 592 F.2d 712, 718–19 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 270 S. REP. NO. 94-996, at 8; see id. at 19 (“The partial elimination of sovereign 
immunity will facilitate nonstatutory judicial review . . . .”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-
1656, at 9, 19 (discussing partial elimination of sovereign immunity to facilitate 
nonstatutory review). 
 271 1970 Hearing, supra note 32, at 27 (comment of Roger C. Cramton); e.g., 1976 
Hearing, supra note 56, at 647 n.189 (analysis of the Center for Governmental 
Responsibility) (arguing that the bill would “abolish the sovereign immunity doctrine for 
the purpose of allowing nonstatutory review of agency action”); see also Cramton Memo, 
supra note 32, at 131 (stating that the committee “abolish[ed] sovereign immunity as a 
defense in nonstatutory review actions”); id. at 139 (“[T]he purpose of the Committee’s 
recommendation is to provide nonstatutory review in some situations in which the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity now stands in the way.”); id. at 128–29 (referring to the APA claim 
as a “nonstatutory review action”). Others perpetuated Cramton’s misstatement. 
 272 See supra text accompanying notes 149–50. 
 273 See supra text accompanying notes 90–95. 
 274 Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949). 
 275 Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963). 
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challenging agency action where “an agency or an officer or 
employee . . . acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of 
legal authority.”276 Thus, the casual misstatement in the House and Senate 
Reports about “nonstatutory review” should not be read to undo the 
deliberation that led to the bill’s passage. 
Committee reports traditionally are thought to be the most reliable form of 
legislative history.277 “Generally, however, legislators do not even read the 
committee reports.”278 Moreover, sometimes “legislative history is not reliable 
because it is generated early in the process and does not reflect the ultimate 
deals entered to get the statute through Congress.”279 For example, Adrian 
Vermeule demonstrated that the Court in Holy Trinity Church “overlooked or 
ignored events that made the Senate committee report irrelevant to the 
statute’s subsequent passage.”280 In the case of § 702, Scalia’s letter of May 
10, 1976 should take precedence over any contrary statements in the 
committee reports.281 That letter is, in effect, a trump card because the bill 
would not have moved without it. Scalia dropped the Executive Branch’s 
opposition to the bill on the condition that the waiver of sovereign immunity 
would “only apply to claims relating to improper official action[] and [would] 
be subject to the other limitations of the [APA].”282 If there is any ambiguity 
in § 702, the letter resolves it by providing clear evidence of the bargain 
Congress struck with the Executive Branch to get the 1976 amendment to the 
APA passed.283 The courts should interpret the amendment accordingly.284 
                                                                                                                     
 276 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). 
 277 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
311 (2d ed. 2006). 
 278 Seidenfeld, supra note 250, at 498. 
 279 ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 277, at 307. 
 280 Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The 
Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1845 (1998). Vermeule 
argues that judicial incompetence in the use of legislative history necessitates a rule 
excluding it as an interpretive source. Id. at 1896. I disagree. If used properly, legislative 
history can be “empirically sound, normatively appealing, and far easier.” Victoria F. 
Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, 
122 YALE L.J. 70, 73 (2012). The history here reveals that the courts of appeals’ myopic 
focus on the committee reports has led to erroneous interpretations of § 702. Cf. ESKRIDGE 
ET AL., supra note 277, at 307 (“Invoking unreliable legislative history is worse than 
ignoring such history altogether.”). 
 281 The Senate Report issued on June 26, 1976 includes the text of Scalia’s letter. 
S. REP. NO. 94-996, at 5 (1976). Apparently, the committee staff did not focus on, or did 
not understand, the inconsistency between the Justice Department’s position and some of 
the statements in the report.  
 282 Letter from Scalia to Kennedy, supra note 42, at 26. 
 283 See Eskridge, supra note 264, at 633–34 (observing that when statutes “reflect 
carefully crafted compromises among . . . various groups,” the Court looks to the records 
of those compromises when interpreting the statute). 
 284 The material I rely on here is in the official legislative history of the 1976 
amendment and is thus a reliable indicator of the bargain between Scalia and Kennedy and 
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V. DEEPER PROBLEMS 
My interpretation of the waiver in § 702 as providing a narrow opening for 
suits against the government is normatively preferable because it respects the 
public deliberation that freed the 1976 amendment from its legislative 
quagmire and enabled its passage. The courts of appeals that interpret the 
amendment as throwing open the courthouse doors, in contrast, disrespect that 
deliberation, raising concerns about separation of powers, democratic 
legitimacy, and institutional competence. 
A. Interpreting the APA 
Recently, I developed a theory about how the APA should be 
interpreted.285 I drew on the work of William Eskridge and John Ferejohn 
concerning superstatutes.286 Eskridge and Ferejohn conceive of superstatutes 
as statutes that were born of deep public deliberation, have stood the test of 
time, and have become entrenched in American law.287 Prime examples are 
the Civil Rights Acts of 1866,288 1871,289 and 1964;290 the Sherman Antitrust 
Act of 1890;291 the National Labor Relations Act of 1935;292 and the Fair 
Labor Standards Act of 1938.293  
Superstatutes inevitably evolve, according to Eskridge and Ferejohn, 
because they are written broadly and, over their long lifetimes, must be applied 
                                                                                                                     
well within the courts’ competence to assess. What kinds of material beyond official 
legislative history would suffice for these purposes is fodder for future inquiry. 
 285 See generally Kovacs, supra note 69. 
 286 See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF 
STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, 
REPUBLIC]; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215 
(2001) [hereinafter Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes]. 
 287 ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 286, at 111; Eskridge & Ferejohn, 
Super-Statutes, supra note 286, at 1216. 
 288 Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982 (2012); see also Eskridge & 
Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 286, at 1225–26. 
 289 Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-
Statutes, supra note 286, at 1225–26. 
 290 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 5, 28, and 42 U.S.C.); see also ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, 
supra note 286, at 88; Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 286, at 1237. 
 291 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012); see also ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, 
REPUBLIC, supra note 286, at 121; Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 286, at 
1231–32. 
 292 National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012); see also 
Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 286, at 1227. 
 293 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–205; see also Eskridge & 
Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 286, at 1227. 
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“to new facts, new needs, [and] new ideas.”294 Eskridge and Ferejohn posit 
that it is normatively preferable for the law to evolve through superstatutes 
than through constitutional amendments or judicial interpretations of the 
Constitution, because superstatutory evolution allows the law to respond to 
changing circumstances in a democratically legitimate way.295 Thus, courts 
and agencies should interpret superstatutes “broadly and evolutively.”296 
Republican deliberation involving the public and representative branches 
of government legitimizes this superstatutory evolution.297 Sometimes the 
public gives feedback directly through elections.298 Absent such direct public 
input, the public gives feedback through the agency that Congress charged 
with implementing and interpreting the superstatute.299 Eskridge and Ferejohn 
conceive of this public deliberation as involving a feedback loop between 
Congress, the agency, the President, the public, and the courts.300 The key to 
legitimizing superstatutory evolution is “a strong connection to the people and 
popular needs.”301  
Courts interpreting superstatutes, according to Eskridge and Ferejohn, 
should be “deliberation-respecting.”302 They should study the statute’s 
legislative history and “its ongoing statutory and administrative evolution” in 
order “to understand the statutory scheme from the perspective of Congress 
and the agency.”303 They should take the “deliberative process seriously, as 
having significant normative force” and recognize that a superstatute 
represents “a thoughtful response to an important social problem adopted after 
intense public debate and congressional deliberation.”304 And they “should 
defer to laws and policies that reflect the deliberated views of Congress and 
the president.”305  
I demonstrated previously that the APA is a superstatute: it was born of a 
lengthy public debate, has taken on normative gravity, and is a fixed feature of 
                                                                                                                     
 294 ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 286, at 272–73; see also id. at 267, 
270. 
 295 William N. Eskridge, Jr., America’s Statutory “constitution,” 41 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1, 35 (2007); see also ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 286, at 8–9, 122, 
167, 263, 334, 374, 445; Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 286, at 1271–76. 
 296 Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 286, at 1249. 
 297 ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 286, at 161. 
 298 E.g., id. at 162–63, 213, 225, 238. 
 299 Id. 
 300 Id. at 19, 23, 26, 78, 105; see also id. at 436 (“[O]ur theory rests upon a longer 
back-and-forth process involving popular and expert proposals, statutory enactments, 
administrative implementation, and popular responses.”). 
 301 Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 286, at 1276; see also ESKRIDGE 
& FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 286, at 103–04. 
 302 ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 286, at 22–23. 
 303 Id. at 266; see also id. at 296. 
 304 Id. at 435. 
 305 Id. at 435–36. 
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our statutory constitution.306 The APA is unlike most superstatutes, however, 
in that no single agency is charged with its implementation.307 Thus, no 
agency is at the hub of a deliberative web linking Congress, the President, the 
courts, and most importantly the public.308 Congress did not anticipate that an 
agency’s interpretation would keep the APA current, but instead anticipated 
that it would take on that task itself.309 Thus, public deliberation about the 
meaning of the APA has been in Congress.310 
One of Eskridge and Ferejohn’s central insights is that statutory 
interpretation should focus on public deliberation. In our democratic 
republic,311 if the law is to evolve to keep up with changing times, it should 
evolve in a way that reflects the public’s will.312 I concluded that the 
exceptional legislative effort that shaped the APA, before and after its 
enactment, and the lack of single-agency implementation must have 
interpretive consequences. First, interpretations of the APA must stay within 
the boundaries of the text that Congress enacted.313 Some words leave room 
for elaboration. The “arbitrary, capricious . . . or otherwise not in accordance 
with law” standard of review, for example, may mean many things.314 Other 
terms are more definite, like § 704’s requirement that administrative remedies 
be exhausted only in certain circumstances.315 
Second, interpretations of the APA must give effect to the compromises 
encoded in the Act. Some provisions were wins for the conservative minority; 
others were wins for the liberal majority; and many were compromises. One 
cannot tell which provision is which, and thus cannot “give sufficient weight 
to the bargain Congress and the President made in 1946,” without examining 
the full context and history of the Act.316  
Third, interpretations of the APA must respect ongoing deliberation about 
the Act, including both amendments that were enacted and those that were 
                                                                                                                     
 306 Kovacs, supra note 69, at 1223–37. 
 307 See id. at 1242–48. 
 308 See id. at 1238–39 (describing agency-centered deliberation). 
 309 S. REP. NO. 79-752 (1945), reprinted in STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 
79TH CONG., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 185, 216–17 (2d 
Sess. 1946). 
 310 See Kovacs, supra note 69, at 1235. 
 311 See Eugene Volokh, Is the United States of America a Republic or a Democracy?, 
WASH. POST (May 13, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/w 
p/2015/05/13/is-the-united-states-of-america-a-republic-or-a-democracy/ [https://perma.cc/ 
N8E7-YU3N] (explaining that the United States is both a republic and a democracy). 
 312 ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 286, at 22–24. 
 313 Kovacs, supra note 69, at 1250. 
 314 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012); see Kovacs, supra note 69, at 1213. 
 315 5 U.S.C. § 704; see Kovacs, supra note 69, at 1213. 
 316 Kovacs, supra note 69, at 1251. 
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defeated after significant debate.317 Finally, if the APA needs to be amended, 
the courts should not be taking on that task themselves, but should be prodding 
Congress to do its job.318 “Judicial deliberation is not a ‘second best’ 
alternative to public deliberation.”319 I concluded that “given the extraordinary 
legislative process that led to the APA’s enactment and the relative paucity of 
agency-based deliberative feedback since then, courts should be particularly 
cautious about interpreting the APA’s text in a way that shifts the balance 
Congress reached through the political process.”320  
B. Disrespecting Deliberation 
Judicial disrespect for the outcome of the public deliberative process raises 
concerns related to constitutionality, democratic legitimacy, and institutional 
competence. Most importantly, when courts interpret the APA in a way that 
pays insufficient heed to political bargains, they violate separation of powers 
and act anti-democratically. The U.S. Constitution assigns to Congress the 
power to make policy, not the courts.321 That structure was designed to avoid 
tyranny and safeguard liberty, and relatedly to ensure that law makers are 
politically accountable.322 In addition, any statutory interpretation that 
disrespects public deliberation “runs the risk of alienating fundamental law 
from popular sources of legitimacy.”323  
Specifically, Congress is entitled to decide whether to expose the United 
States to suit. The Supreme Court said in Larson that “it is not for this Court to 
examine” which government activities require the protection of sovereign 
immunity and which do not.324 “That is a function of the Congress.”325 Indeed, 
the APA itself codifies the principle that Congress may make agency action 
unreviewable. Section 701(a) precludes judicial review if another statute 
precludes review or commits agency action to agency discretion by law.326 
                                                                                                                     
 317 Id. at 1251–53; see also Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 
92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1461 (2014). 
 318 Kovacs, supra note 69, at 1253. 
 319 Kathryn E. Kovacs, Pixelating Administrative Common Law in Perez v. Mortgage 
Bankers Association, 125 YALE L.J. F. 31, 36 (2015). 
 320 Kovacs, supra note 69, at 1254. 
 321 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1, 19–20 (1985). 
 322 Id. at 19–20, 24, 27; see also Kovacs, supra note 69, at 1255–56. 
 323 ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 286, at 445; see also Kovacs, supra 
note 319, at 42 (stating that courts “lack the connection to the public that renders 
lawmaking valid in our system of government”). 
 324 Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 705 (1949). 
 325 Id.; see also Bagley, supra note 12, at 1320. 
 326 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2012); see e.g., Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 193 (1993) 
(holding that Indian Health Service’s decision to discontinue a program was “committed to 
agency discretion by law” and was therefore unreviewable under § 701(a)(2)). 
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Certainly, judicial review of agency action is crucial, and courts are often 
swayed by the desire to provide access to the courts. The Supreme Court laid 
the modern foundation for this concern in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 
where it said “judicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved person 
will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was 
the purpose of Congress.”327 As Louis Jaffe observed, “The availability of 
judicial review is the necessary condition, psychologically if not logically, of a 
system of administrative power which purports to be legitimate, or legally 
valid.”328 Judicial review ensures, among other things, “that agencies engage 
in reasoned decision making” and act within the confines of their statutory 
authority.329 It serves “fundamental values . . . including upholding the ideal of 
the rule of law, protecting individual rights under the law, and imposing 
checks and balances on agency discretion.”330 
In his article on the common law presumption that official action is subject 
to judicial review, Nicholas Bagley acknowledged that judicial review “may 
enhance agency accountability, improve the quality of agency decisionmaking, 
and legitimize governmental action.”331 But Bagley trounced the presumption, 
refuting each of the justifications proffered in its support. He concluded that 
“discard[ing] the best interpretation of a statute in an effort to advance 
background values”  is “rather openly countermajoritarian” and “is in tension 
with th[e] assignment of constitutional responsibility” to Congress to 
determine “when to open the courts to suits against the government.”332  
Courts addressing the scope of the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity 
are thus faced with a choice between two legitimate normative goals: 
providing access to the courts and adhering to constitutional structure. I 
                                                                                                                     
 327 Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967), abrogated by Califano v. 
Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977); see also Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 
U.S. 667, 670 (1986). 
 328 LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 320 (1965). 
 329 Mila Sohoni, The Administrative Constitution in Exile, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
923, 940 (2016); see also Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 546 n.6 (2000) (“The purpose of judicial review is to guarantee the 
legality of agency decision making by monitoring fidelity to legal procedure and 
compliance with substantive norms of rationality.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Delegation and 
Judicial Review, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 73, 77 (2010) (“Judicial review requires the 
agency to give some reason related to the standard Congress has supplied, to act 
consistently or explain its departure from past courses of conduct in applying the standard, 
and to respond to plausible objections grounded in the factual or legal assumptions that 
support its action.”). 
 330 Thomas O. Sargentich, The Critique of Active Judicial Review of Administrative 
Agencies: A Reevalution, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 599, 601 (1997). 
 331 Bagley, supra note 12, at 1319; see also id. at 1321 (“When it comes to managing 
bureaucracies, judicial review has a lot going for it: it encourages agencies to explain 
themselves, to respect individual rights, and to adhere to law.”); Cass R. Sunstein, On the 
Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency Action, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522, 
522–26 (summarizing the benefits of judicial review of agency action). 
 332 Bagley, supra note 12, at 1320–21. 
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demonstrated above that the best interpretation of § 702 reads the waiver of 
sovereign immunity as applying only to APA claims and as limited by the 
other requirements of the APA. Rejecting that interpretation in an effort to 
advance the values of judicial review raises serious constitutional and 
legitimacy concerns.333 
Interpretations of the APA that give insufficient respect to the outcome of 
the public deliberative process also run the risk of creating unforeseen 
consequences. Courts usually hear from one agency at a time in “case-by-case 
snapshots.”334 Congress, in contrast, can hear from multiple agencies and 
interest groups, consider multiple proposals, and adjust over time.335 Thus, 
Congress is in a better position to determine which rules of administrative law 
will be most effective.336 As Nicholas Bagley observed, when Congress strikes 
a balance “between a host of incommensurate values,” “[t]he courts have no 
constitutional authority to revise that judgment and no epistemic basis for 
thinking they can make a better one.”337 That is particularly true when 
Congress is deciding whether, when, and how to expose federal agencies to 
suit, a decision that “turns on a dizzying array of variables that are difficult to 
measure and even more difficult to weigh against one another.”338  
Judicial decisions that allow access to the courts to challenge official 
action have many benefits.339 When those decisions disrespect the balance 
reached through the political process, however, separation of powers, 
democratic legitimacy, and institutional competence concerns outweigh those 
benefits.340 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Understanding the APA’s text and the compromises encoded in that text 
requires a close examination of the full statutory history and context. This 
Article provides that analysis and shows that the majority of federal courts of 
appeals are misinterpreting the waiver of sovereign immunity in § 702. That 
waiver should be interpreted to apply only to APA claims and to be 
constrained by the other limitations in the APA. That is the bargain that the 
Executive Branch struck with Congress that allowed the 1976 amendment to 
pass.  
                                                                                                                     
 333 I do not contest here the normative value of sovereign immunity doctrine, as I 
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The Supreme Court should step in to clarify the scope of the waiver in 
§ 702. Misinterpreting the APA can have significant ramifications. In 
particular, doctrinal confusion about the availability of relief under the APA 
imposes costs on the government and potential plaintiffs.341 The enduring 
confusion about officer suits increases the urgency of clarifying the boundaries 
of the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity. 
The courts’ misinterpretation of § 702, however, raises even more 
troubling concerns: it offends separation of powers and lacks democratic 
legitimacy. Justice Scalia would have been troubled by the use of legislative 
history to interpret § 702, which is ironic given that he created the most 
relevant history. I am troubled instead by the shallowness of the courts’ 
analysis and the cherry-picking of bits of history that support a preferred 
outcome. Historic analysis must appreciate the full legislative context if it is to 
be valid.342 It must respect the outcome of the public deliberative process. In 
the case of the waiver in § 702, the history is easily recounted, and the courts’ 
errors are patent. Scalia’s bargain must not be ignored. 
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